The Fall of Communism in China: Lessons From the Collapse of the USSR
Part 1: Introduction
Part 2. The Communist Framework
Part 3. The Implantation of the Communist Framework Through Force and Coercion
Part 4. Post-Stalin Evolution and the Collapse of the USSR
Part 5: The CCP 1989-1992. Ideological Hybridization and Attack Strategy
Part 6. The CCP 1993 – 2021: Evolution and Current Situation
Part 7. Conclusions: Is the Collapse of the CCP Near?
During this journey, from the Communist Manifesto of 1848 to today, we have occasionally relied on concepts based on framing theory in its double sense of “frame” (social) and “schema” (mental) [1]. Our impression is that the application of this theory to political questions is often too tactical and short-term, giving language, the transmitting instrument, excessive importance relative to what language carries (ideas, social dynamics). The concept of “frame” is as simple as it is difficult because it encompasses the complexity of the social context of the moment, the channels through which ideas spread and the various social interactions necessary for certain ideas to become “fixed” in individual and collective minds. In fact, many sources speak of the “power of ideas,” and along the same lines we affirm that 1) frames, once created, operate autonomously and sometimes with a logic independent of that of their creator(s), and 2) everything that is alive (frames and ideas included) resists dying.
The first conclusion, after this series of articles, is that the essence and behavior of the communist frame does not act strictly as defined in the Manifesto or in “Marxist-Leninist” orthodoxy, because of the inconsistency between the force of opposition “to everything existing” that comes to implant the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and that future classless, stateless society. In the end, as in all revolutionary movements, it is the force of change that prevails over utopia, and even more so if, as is the case here, that force is contrary to all universal truths, including justice or individual freedom. For example, in the case of the French Revolution, it was the elimination of the divine right granted to the king to rule, the equality of all men, that was the true force of change (aided by a context of inequalities and economic crisis). And, as we said, the fact that, once created, the frame resists disappearing meant that, when it was endangered by coalitions of foreign countries and opponents seeking to restore the monarchy in France, it triggered the dynamics that ended up deriving in what was called “the Reign of Terror” (June 1793 – July 1794).
As we explained in the introductory article, under the Committee of Public Safety led by Robespierre, tens of thousands of executions took place during that year, including those of King Louis XVI and his wife, Queen Marie Antoinette. Once the frame is formed, it always chooses the right person because the selection occurs through a current of change that is irresistible for some and horrible for others. It is the position the person takes toward the frame that makes them suitable or not. In fact, only those who are able to operate outside the frame can control it. The rest, the majority who operate from within, are inevitably controlled by it. Robespierre felt, from within the frame of the Revolution, the risks to its viability from potential attacks by foreign powers and internal opposition and put them ahead of other personal values, such as his opposition to the death penalty, going so far as to say: “Terror without virtue is disastrous. Virtue without terror is powerless.” He worked for the survival of the frame, lost control of the revolutionary process after a time in power and died when he could no longer serve it. The values “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” undoubtedly survived because what the Revolution meant, including the elimination of the figure of the king through his beheading, became fixed in the collective imagination, but the movement that began the first French republic ended up dismantled within barely 10 years of Robespierre’s death with the arrival of Napoleon Bonaparte. It reached an extreme and could not sustain itself.
Returning to the communist frame, Marx and Engels defined communism as a “specter” and, in reality, the Communist Party is the embodiment of that “specter,” so, consequently, the communist frame operates and focuses on its survival. No living being, group or idea accepts simply disappearing, much less one stemming from an absolute power that, as in this case, directs its actions primarily to social control and the means of production in order to guarantee its permanence in power. This inevitably implies an inefficient allocation of resources, as a priority share is devoted to control and repression instead of entrepreneurship and innovation. The millions of surveillance cameras and facial recognition systems, the “great wall” to control the internet, the points-based social control system, the labor and re-education camps for the population or the deployment of the Army in all towns are examples of this. Returning to the example of the opium wars [2], China, despite having an army of 800,000 men and a GDP far greater than that of the United Kingdom, had to face during the 19th century an average of 25 uprisings and riots a year, which prevented it from mobilizing adequately in the face of the foreign threat. Although China’s resources were enormous in aggregate, most were used to subsist, whereas the United Kingdom, although it produced half of what China did, had 13 times less population, which allowed it more wealth available for other purposes. One of the main conclusions to be drawn from this and from Michael Beckley’s book [2] (which we referenced in the previous article) is that “repression is very expensive” and, as we said, it distorts an optimal allocation of resources. Indirectly, but along the same lines, we have government spending, for example, which in the US is 3.4% of its national GDP, in Japan 2.8%, and in China 25.6%, while according to the IMF (April 2021) GDP per capita is $68,309 in the US, $44,585 in Japan and $18,931 in China. In addition, we have the historical proof that all communist nations are characterized by poor living conditions for the population and a large social gap between the communist elites and the rest.
Another essential characteristic of the communist frame is violent opposition, continuous confrontation. As we said in past articles, within the frame, like every finite element, lies what defines it, what characterizes it, together with what will end it. That is why we turn again to the wisdom of Sun Tzu, which has been so convenient in the implementation of the CCP’s strategies, to finish characterizing it: “I have heard of military operations that were clumsy and sudden, but I have never seen any expert in the art of war keep a campaign going for long. It is never beneficial to a nation to let a military operation drag on for a long time.” And later he continues: “Thus, what is important in a military operation is victory, not persistence. Persistence is not beneficial. An army is like fire; if you do not put it out, it will consume itself.” Consequently, permanent confrontation implies a certain collapse.
In fact, the journey through the evolution of communism, first in Russia and then in the Soviet Union, has given us an estimate of how long the communist frame could last in a scenario of strict application. In reality, not only Chernobyl, but the very appearance of a figure like Gorbachev is a consequence of the frame’s exhaustion and loss of power. When the frame is strong, it conveys its convictions sufficiently for mobilization to serve its cause, or it acts as a restrictive element on options not aligned with it. The point is that the frame is something defined; it cannot be anything else, and its systematic application leads only to a specific end. Specifically, the application of the principle of the priority of the Party and its permanence in power and that of continuous confrontation against all traditional values demonstrated a survival of 74 years in the Soviet case. As we said, the fact that the members of the Politburo chose a reformer implies that the communist frame could no longer sustain its restrictive power and inadvertently leaned on a person who began a process of dismantling without, perhaps, being fully aware of it himself. The degree of corruption and degradation of the system was so great that it could not prevent catastrophes like Chernobyl or the rise and reforms of Gorbachev.
For the above reasons, the case of China is surprising internationally, since neither its approach to the market economy nor, as some analysts have claimed, its move away from Marx toward Confucius (“harmonious society”), nor its economic, political and military growth fit the traditional communist model. What is more, taking advantage of the West’s current weakness, the CCP is promoting the Chinese development model as a successful alternative for other countries, fostering the view that China is not applying pure communism and that it is a unique social experiment in the world and beyond all comparison. Well, as we have tried to demonstrate in this series of articles, all these impressions are the product of a perfectly calculated deception. This ideological hybridization represented by “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is simply a “smokescreen,” a lie to be able to steal resources from the enemy (the West) and grow stronger without being noticed. In reality there is no Chinese domestic market, there are no private Chinese companies, there is no free competition or intellectual or technological property. The CCP has been playing with “marked cards” since long before entering the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a system of bribes and coercion perfectly coordinated by the Government has helped maintain this farce. This attack from a multiplicity of fronts went practically invisible to the West because of its greed, in fact achieving the “formlessness” Sun Tzu spoke of, until the launch of the expansionist plans by Xi Jinping.
We have tried to demonstrate in this series of articles that the CCP has at no time abandoned the essence of the communist frame, that it has maintained a strict application of the frame in the same way the USSR did. There are coincidences in events during the development of communism in both countries that we cannot explain rationally but that we could understand as signals of a change of stage.
At the time of the implantation of the communist economy in both countries, 8-9 years after Stalin and Mao came to power, terrible droughts occurred which, together with disastrous government decisions, caused millions of deaths. Next, 14 years after Stalin came to power and 17 years in the case of Mao, thousands, millions of members of the Party itself were purged. Later, during the period of relaxation essential for the definitive fixing of the communist frame, an event of weakness 11 years after the death of Stalin and Mao (the Cuban missile crisis and Tiananmen) again triggered a new adjustment. All these events arise at more or less similar intervals. In the same way, the COVID-19 pandemic occurs 70 years into the CCP’s rule, while Chernobyl occurs 69 years after the October Revolution. As we said, communism ruled in Russia/the USSR for 74 years; another autocratic party with communist beginnings, the PRI in Mexico, ruled for 70, and, for example, in Cuba it has been 62 years with clear signs of wear. Currently the CCP has been in power for 72 years.
Undoubtedly, we do not have sufficient information or historical perspective to affirm that COVID-19 is the CCP’s Chernobyl or how much time exactly it has left in power but, given that we are convinced of the strict application of the communist frame, we do believe that the end of the CCP is near. In fact, although the regime’s propaganda and secrecy prevent, as happened with the Soviet Union, a truthful picture of the real situation, we can show some evidence, in addition to that explained in the previous article, of the system’s degradation:
- The impressive trajectory of the main Chinese companies, in addition to the fact that their sales are guaranteed in their giant domestic market, is partly deceptive, particularly with regard to their competitiveness relative to foreign companies. Huawei [3], for example, sells network base stations and 5G network equipment to Western companies at 40% of their real price. When Huawei signs a contract with an international customer, the state-owned China Development Bank offers a loan to the buyer and transfers the money to Huawei immediately. If the customer cannot repay the loan, Huawei does not suffer the loss but the China Development Bank does, which then ends up passing that debt on to the Chinese people. Huawei reported a net profit of 47.5 billion yuan ($7.2 billion) in 2016 but the China Development Bank had a loss of 82.8 billion yuan ($12.6 billion). The bank lost 257.3 billion yuan ($39.2 billion) between 2013 and 2017, while Huawei kept improving its results. This type of backing from a state bank is an advantage Western companies do not have, but it distorts a true picture of the real capabilities and strengths of its companies.
- The aging [3] of the population, with the effect of declining savings, generates significant pressure on the banking system because Chinese people save a lot to compensate for the state’s meager social security provision. For three decades, ordinary people’s savings financed the spectacular indebtedness of state-owned enterprises, but what will happen when the savings need to be withdrawn to finance hundreds of millions of retirements? Of course, since nobody knows how much state-owned enterprises really borrowed (everyone lies), the severity of the impact is not known, but it is certain that it will be very significant.
- China Merchants Bank [3] reported in 2019 that 2% of people in China control 80% of the wealth, and Peking University reported that in China the Gini coefficient was 0.73 in 2014 (a country is considered to have large income differences if the number is above 0.4 and a severe income gap if it is above 0.5). According to Forbes in April 2021, Beijing became the city with the largest number of billionaires, 100 in total. The benefit of opening China’s economy was partly seized by the top 500 officials and their families. They transferred sums of money out of China, including to Hong Kong, the US and Switzerland. In 2020 it was reported that 100 Chinese have deposited more than 7.8 trillion yuan ($1.2 trillion US dollars) in the Swiss bank UBS alone.
- According to the Hurun wealth report [3], among the representatives of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the 83 richest individuals have an average asset value of $335 million. By contrast, the Center for Responsive Politics shows that the richest members of the US Congress have an average asset value of only $5.64 million. While 600 million Chinese citizens have monthly incomes of less than 1,000 yuan (about $154), China’s richest lawmakers have 60 times more assets than their counterparts in the United States. In the United States, the average per capita income is 11 times higher than in China, while the price of housing in China is 5 times higher than in the United States.
- Regarding the % of spouses and children of senior officials who reside outside China [3]. According to US government statistics, for CCP officials of ministerial rank or above, including retirees, 74.5% of their children hold a green card or US citizenship, as do 91% of their grandchildren.
- The government’s growing bans on capital leaving China demonstrate the elites’ growing distrust, and the regime’s attacks on figures it created itself, such as Jack Ma (founder of Alibaba), together with Xi’s periodic purges in the Party, are signs of an exhaustion of the model.
- The COVID-19 pandemic itself, its devastating effects worldwide, the lack of knowledge about its origins and the secrecy in its management by the Chinese regime is another sign of the system’s degradation. The CCP has taken advantage of the moral corruption of Western society to spread like a disease throughout the rest of the world and, surprisingly, the symbolism of the pandemic exemplifies it perfectly.
Traditionally, Western society has assumed that the docile character of the Chinese population makes it very difficult for a revolution to occur inside the country, but it forgets that another very important characteristic of the Chinese people is their pragmatic character, and if the population, weary of institutional corruption, inequality and restrictions on freedoms, sees that the CCP cannot provide them with the minimum, they will not hesitate to get rid of it. It is enough for international markets to stop trusting China’s economy, or for foreign companies to stop offshoring their manufacturing, or for Chinese products to stop being bought, or for the population’s unrest to increase until it frightens enough CCP members; it is enough for just one of these things to happen for everything to fall like a house of cards. The “red dragon” is in reality, as they say, a “paper tiger” [2] and its end is near. The best thing the rest of the nations could do is cut all commercial and diplomatic relations with the CCP as soon as possible so that its fall affects them as little as possible. Waiting for the “too big to fail” principle to apply and for some form of covert rescue is risky and assumes a position of strength on the part of the rest of the international community that is by no means certain. In any case, after its collapse nothing will be the same again.
“When people are not afraid of death,
There is no use threatening them with it.
When people live in fear of dying,
And breaking the law is equivalent to dying,
Who will dare to break the law?
There is always an executioner.
If you want to take his place,
It is like pretending to be a carpenter and cutting wood.
If you want to cut wood like a carpenter,
you are sure to cut your own hand.”
Tao Te Ching LXXIV, Lao Tzu
References:
[1] Nadia Sabrina Koziner-CONICET-University of Buenos Aires-National University of Quilmes – “Background and foundations of framing theory in communication” – March-April 2013.
[2] https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/china-paper-dragon/618778/
[3] https://es.minghui.org/html/articles/2021/4/3/119442.html; https://es.minghui.org/html/articles/2021/4/19/119583.html
[4] Sun Tzu – “The Art of War”

















