North Korea, despite the UN Security Council ban on its ballistic missile tests, continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs in 2021, according to a new UN report. In January 2022 alone, North Korea launched a record 11 missiles, including two hypersonic missiles and the first launch since 2017 of a Hwasong-12 mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile that could reach U.S. territory with an estimated range of 4,500 kilometers. In 2017, North Korea tested the Hwasong-15, which has an estimated range of 8,500 to 13,000 kilometers.
Both U.S. and South Korean officials expressed concern that the Hwasong-12 test indicated North Korea would resume testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and nuclear weapons.
In addition, North Korea has an underground military base, used to store ICBMs, just 25 kilometers from its border with China. According to analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the site was chosen to deter U.S. preemptive strikes against the base, in order to avoid provoking Beijing. “The location near the Chinese border acts as a potential deterrent to a preemptive attack that could affect Chinese security interests,” noted Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at CSIS.
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“In today’s world, where many countries waste time dealing with the United States with submission and blind obedience, only our country on this planet can shake the world by firing a missile with the U.S. mainland within its range,” North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement. “There are more than 200 countries in the world, but only a few have hydrogen bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles.” North Korea has said in the past that the Hwasong-12 can carry a “heavy, large-scale nuclear warhead.”
Eight Security Council members (the United States, Albania, Brazil, France, Ireland, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom) and Japan described North Korea’s Hwasong-12 launch as a “significant escalation” that “seeks to further destabilize the region.”
China, for its part, called on North Korea for “flexibility.” “They should present more attractive and practical approaches, policies and actions, more flexible, to accommodate the concerns” of North Korea, Chinese ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun said. “The key to resolving this issue is already in the hands of the United States.”
China’s demand for “flexibility” from North Korea seems to coincide with the Chinese Communist Party’s ambitions in the region. North Korea’s recent actions may even have been encouraged by China.
“After all, China has great influence over the ruling Kim family in the North and can, in practice, demand that the North Koreans do what it wants,” China expert Gordon G. Chang wrote.
According to some analysts, China was decisive in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to Peter Huessy, director of strategic deterrence studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, writing:
“The North Korean nuclear program began in 1965 with the Soviet construction of a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor. But it was Chinese and Pakistani help that allowed North Korea to begin construction of a 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, and a secret reprocessing facility, in the mid-1980s. North Korea’s construction of a covert uranium enrichment facility around 2000 and the first test explosion of a nuclear device in 2006 were probably made possible by the help of Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, and were based on uranium enrichment and nuclear design plans originally obtained from China.”
Crucially, according to Huessy:
“According to unclassified intelligence reports to Congress, there are five key Chinese banks and a specially created holding company that finance North Korea’s missile and nuclear technology programs.”
China’s main strategic concern on the Korean peninsula is apparently to end the U.S. presence there and keep it out of U.S. hands so that China can finally establish itself as the hegemonic power in the region. There are currently about 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. This is the third-largest U.S. military presence abroad, after Japan and Germany. North Korean escalation in the form of increased missile tests and the resumption of nuclear and ICBM tests to pressure the United States into making concessions, in the form of withdrawing troops from South Korea, would play directly into China’s hands, allowing it to replace the United States and establish itself as the main power in the region.
“North Korea is likely to increase pressure on the United States by taking a series of steps toward an ICBM test,” Cheon Seong-whun, former director of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded research institute in Seoul, said.
“They are looking to take actions, which we believe are fundamentally destabilizing, as a way to increase pressure,” a U.S. official in Washington told reporters.
In response to North Korea’s Hwasong-12 test, the U.S. called for direct talks with the country “without preconditions.”
“We think it is completely appropriate and completely right to start having some serious discussions. This requires a response. You will see us take some steps that are designed to show our commitment to our allies… and at the same time we reiterate our call for diplomacy. We are prepared and take very seriously trying to hold talks that address the concerns of both sides.”
If the Biden administration wants to resolve the growing North Korean threat, it will have to start doing things differently. It will have to abandon “the same basic strategy on North Korea that Washington used for more than two decades,” as Markus Garlauskas, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, who spent almost 20 years in the U.S. government dealing with North Korea, noted.
“This strategy focused on achieving a ‘strategic decision’ from Pyongyang to negotiate an end to its nuclear weapons program and on securing Beijing’s cooperation to create the necessary economic leverage.”
However, China does not appear to be interested in cooperating with the United States on North Korea. Therefore, attempts to secure “Beijing’s cooperation” to exert the necessary economic leverage over North Korea are futile exercises. A new strategy must finally recognize China’s role as North Korea’s sponsor for the strategic purposes of the Chinese Communist Party in the region.
It is clear that China cannot be trusted to voluntarily use its influence over North Korea to persuade Kim Jong-un to abandon his missile and nuclear program. To resolve the stalemate, it is necessary to use means that leave China no option but to cooperate on North Korea.
One very effective way to do so, as Gordon Chang suggested, would be to cut off from the global financial system the large Chinese banks and companies that support North Korea’s nuclear and missile technology, by designating them a “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the Patriot Act.
“And as big as the Bank of China is (it is the fourth-largest bank in the world, measured by assets), it is surely not the largest Chinese bank laundering cash for Kim,” Gordon Chang wrote.
“That honor may belong to China’s largest bank, and the world’s largest, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. In addition, the remaining two of the Big Four, the world’s second- and third-largest banks, have also been implicated in handling dirty money for the Kims. In short, U.S. policymakers know how to get China to start acting responsibly.”
The question now is: will the Biden administration muster the political will to designate those large Chinese banks under Section 311 of the Patriot Act?
This article was originally published in Gatestone on August 5, 2022
Author: Judith Bergman























