Taliban Help Persecute Afghan Uyghurs to Woo Beijing

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The fall of the Afghan capital to the Taliban is not only an existential crisis for Kabul’s female population, religious minorities, journalists, human rights activists and those who held key roles in the previous Afghan administration or in US-led forces, but also for the families of Afghan Uyghurs.

“If someone knocks on the door, I scream that it’s the Chinese government coming to take us back to China,” an Afghan Uyghur woman told the Uyghur Human Rights Project.

These fears were amplified when the Taliban announced that they consider China a “friend” of Afghanistan and are willing to help Beijing detain suspects with links to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist group aligned with Al Qaeda.

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“China is a friendly country and we welcome it for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan,” Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen told a Chinese state media outlet last month.

Earlier this year, the overthrown Afghan government detained 10 Chinese regime spies who were creating a fake ETIM cell in Afghanistan to trap Afghan Uyghurs, which shows the level of paranoia Beijing maintains toward an Islamic separatist group estimated to have only a few hundred militants.

It is estimated that some 2,000 Uyghurs currently live in Afghanistan, but although most have lived in the country for years and many hold Afghan citizenship, their official identification forms still list them as “Chinese emigrants,” raising fears that they will be used as a bargaining chip or diplomatic gesture by the Taliban to win Beijing’s favor.

READ ALSO: Afghanistan Arrests a Chinese Terrorist Commando in Kabul

It is telling that the Taliban adopt the Pakistani government’s diplomatic double-speak in denouncing the oppression of Muslims worldwide, but remain silent about the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in China to keep Beijing’s favor.

“We are concerned about the oppression of Muslims, whether in Palestine, Myanmar or China, and we are concerned about the oppression of non-Muslims anywhere in the world, but what we are not going to do is interfere in China’s internal affairs,” the Taliban spokesman told reporters last month.

It is clear that the Taliban want to show the Chinese government that they welcome it as a partner in the post-US military occupation era.

However, detaining and deporting ETIM militants aligned with Al Qaeda to please Beijing is easier said than done, because doing so undermines the Taliban’s legitimacy as a jihadist organization and risks triggering retaliation from a “complex network of other Islamist militants across Central Asia,” according to Haiyun Ma, associate professor at Frostburg State University.

There is a risk that the Taliban will falsely accuse Afghan Uyghur emigrants of having ties to ETIM and then deport them to China to show that they want to cooperate with Beijing on counterterrorism and security matters. For this reason, the Uyghur Human Rights Project urges the media not to exaggerate the supposed threats to China’s security in Afghanistan, to prevent Beijing from using these comments as cover to expand its “counterterrorism” operations against the Uyghur minority.

Bradley Jardine, a fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and author of the report “Nets Cast from the Earth to the Sky: China’s Hunt for Pakistan’s Uyghurs,” has said that China has conducted low-level diplomacy with the Taliban to ensure compliance on issues relating to obscure Uyghur militant groups within Taliban-controlled territories in the past.

“In the late 1990s, the Taliban deported several Uyghurs at China’s request and moved entire communities from remote villages to major cities as a means of better monitoring their activities,” he said. “Ultimately, the Taliban will use the Uyghur minorities as a way of bridging relations with China and obtaining much-needed investment in Afghanistan’s war-devastated economy.”

Conversely, China will use its burgeoning relationship with the Taliban as an opportunity to expand its campaign against Uyghurs in Afghanistan and root out “anything China considers Uyghur militancy within the region,” Jardine said.

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This article was originally published in Byline Times on August 23, 2021.

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