The latest macroeconomic figures show that China’s slowdown is much more severe than expected and cannot be attributed solely to COVID-19 lockdowns.
The lockdowns have an enormous impact. In 26 of mainland China’s 31 provinces, COVID cases are rising and the fear of a Shanghai-style lockdown is huge. Information coming out of Shanghai showed that these drastic lockdowns cause enormous harm to the population. Millions of citizens without food or medicine and a rise in suicides showed that the infamous “zero COVID” policy often disguises mass population control and repression.
It is easy to use the COVID-19 shutdowns as the reason for the weakening of China’s economy, but that would be a crude oversimplification. The problem runs deeper.
China is going through a sharp slowdown caused by the bursting of its enormous real estate bubble and the crackdown on the private sector, which led to a cut in investment growth.
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According to Nomura Research, China faces its worst slowdown since the COVID outbreak in 2020 and the world should be worried about a new decline, as the challenges persist. Official GDP figures can be manipulated to hit the government’s target, but all the other macro figures point to much weaker growth.
We must remember that there are two ways the Chinese government “boosts” real GDP: by publishing a low inflation figure and GDP deflator, and by massively increasing credit and infrastructure spending. However, those two cannot hide how significant the weakening of China’s economy is, because it is now structural.
The collapse of the real estate bubble is the biggest problem. A research paper by Kenneth Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang estimated that real estate accounts for about 29% of China’s GDP. It is impossible for the Chinese government to offset the impact of such a massive part of the economy with other high-growth sectors. In addition, the impact of the real estate sector on the labor market is hard to replace. Economist George Magnus warned that the impact of the real estate collapse would last for years.
To add to a difficult real estate problem, government intervention in the private sector, called the “crackdown”, makes it even harder to boost growth with other industries and businesses. The fear of constant political intervention caused a massive slowdown in foreign direct investment growth, as well as fear of deploying capital and taking risks in the Chinese economy only to suffer severe penalties from the authorities when profits arrive.
The extent of the deterioration of China’s economy was evident in recent leading indicators. The Caixin China Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) plunged in March 2022 to 48.1, a 25-month low, indicating contraction. The Caixin services PMI plunged to 42.0 in March from 50.2 in February, falling below the level that separates growth from contraction. This reading indicates the biggest drop in activity since February 2020.
Political intervention in the technology sector, one of the main job creators in China, raised fears of hiring freezes and layoffs, according to several media outlets. In addition, the Central Bank’s decision to cut reserve requirements for banks did not prevent a significant fall in credit growth, according to JP Morgan.
On top of all this is a currency, the yuan, used in fewer than 3% of global transactions, according to Reuters, due to extreme capital controls and the exchange rate fixing imposed by the Central Bank. Confidence in the local currency is low because of extreme intervention in the foreign exchange market, which prevents China from having a truly international means of payment.
China’s high debt is also a problem. Total debt stands above 300% of GDP, according to the Institute of International Finance (IIF). The European Central Bank (ECB) notes that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio for the entire private sector exceeds 250% and that the corporate component of this debt is the highest in the world. The ECB also pointed to the risk created because a “significant proportion of financing is supplied to the corporate sector by non-bank financial institutions”, leading to greater risk-taking and a shadow banking system that leads to major inefficiencies and solvency problems.
The aggressive and misguided lockdowns hurt supply chains and activity, but the structural problems of growing intervention in the currency and industries, as well as a heavily indebted economic model, are likely to drag on real growth and employment for a long time.
This article was originally published in Zero Hedge on April 17, 2022.
Author: Tyler Durden























