guerra china

Gordon Chang: What to Do About China (Part 2)

Tiempo de lectura: 22 minutos

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Gordon Chang: What to Do About China (Part 1)

Question: Why do you think China attacked the world with the coronavirus?

Chang: I believe that SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen that causes COVID-19, is not natural. There are, for example, unnatural arrangements of amino acids, such as the double CGG sequence, that are not found in nature.

We are not one hundred percent certain about the origin of this pathogen. However, we are one hundred percent certain of something else: that for about five weeks, perhaps even five months, Chinese leaders knew this disease was highly transmissible from human to human, but told the world it was not.

At the same time that they locked down their own country (Xi Jinping, by locking down, was indicating that he thought it was an effective way to stop the disease), he pressured other countries not to impose travel restrictions and quarantines on arrivals from China. It was those arrivals from China that turned what should have been an epidemic confined to central China into a global pandemic. As of today, more than eight million people have died outside China. What happened? Nobody imposed costs on China.

For at least half a decade, perhaps a little longer, Chinese military researchers have been writing openly about a new type of biological warfare. This was, for example, in the 2017 edition of “The Science of Military Strategy,” the authoritative publication of China’s National Defense University.

They talk about a new type of biological warfare of “ethnic-specific genetic attacks.” In other words, pathogens that will leave the Chinese immune but make everyone else sick and kill them, which means China’s next disease could be a civilization killer.

Remember, Xi Jinping must be thinking: “I got away with killing eight million people. Why wouldn’t I unleash a biological attack against the United States? Look at what the virus has done not only to kill Americans but also to divide American society.”

Many military analysts say the first seconds of a war with China will be fought in outer space. They will blind our satellites, shoot them down, do all kinds of things. Those claims are wrong.

The first day of war against the United States happens about six months earlier, when they release pathogens in the United States. Then we will have that day in space. The war starts here, with a pathogen: a virus, a microbe, a bug of some kind. That is where it starts.

Question: You mentioned 1939. Taiwan is today’s Poland. We are getting mixed signals: Biden invites Taiwan’s foreign minister to his inauguration, but then we hear Ned Price, his State Department spokesman, say the United States will always respect the one-China policy. Do you mean we are setting aside the defense of Taiwan?

Chang: The one-China policy is something many people misunderstand. Probably because Beijing uses propaganda to try to blur the issue. China has a one-China principle: that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, period.

We have a one-China policy, which is different. We recognize Beijing as the legitimate government of China. We also say that Taiwan’s status is unresolved. Then, the third part of our one-China policy is that the resolution of Taiwan’s status must be with the consent of the people on both sides of the Strait. In other words, it is code for peace, a peaceful resolution.

Our policy is defined by the one-China policy, the Three Communiqués, Reagan’s Six Assurances and the Taiwan Relations Act.

Our policy is hard to articulate for someone named Joe Biden, because he came back from a campaign trip to Michigan, and a reporter asked him about Taiwan, and Biden said: “Don’t worry about it. We have it covered. I had a phone call with Xi Jinping and he agreed to abide by the Taiwan agreement.”

In official U.S. discourse there is no “Taiwan agreement.” A reporter then asked Ned Price what Biden meant by the Taiwan agreement. Ned Price said: “The Taiwan agreement means the Three Communiqués, the Six Assurances, the Taiwan Relations Act and the one-China policy.”

Ned Price could not tell the truth because Xi Jinping did not agree with the U.S. position on Taiwan. That is clear. In the Biden administration there is either complete confusion or a barefaced lie about this.

Biden’s policies on Taiwan are not horrible, but they are not appropriate for this moment either. For decades, we had this policy of “strategic ambiguity,” in which we do not tell either side what we would do in the face of an imminent conflict. That worked in a benign period. We are no longer in a benign period. We are in one of the most dangerous periods in history.

We need a policy of “strategic clarity,” in which we tell China that we will defend Taiwan. We also tell it that we will extend a mutual defense treaty to Taiwan if it wants one, and that we will put U.S. troops on the island as a tripwire.

Question: Do you think he does not say it because he has no intention of doing it, so in a way, he is telling the truth?

Chang: Biden’s mind is hard to understand. We do not know what the administration would do. We have never known, since Allen Dulles, what any administration would do with respect to Taiwan. We knew what Dulles would have done. We should be really worried because there are voices in the administration that would hand Taiwan, and other parts of the world, over to China. It would probably start with John Kerry; that is just a guess.

Question: You mentioned China’s growing economic problems earlier. Would you consider that taking action on the huge trade deficits we have with China contributes to that problem?

Chang: Yes, we absolutely should. Go back to a day that, in my mind, lives in infamy, which is January 15, 2020, when President Trump signed the Phase One trade deal, which I believe was a mistake. In that Phase One trade deal, it was very easy for China to comply, because there were specific targets China had to meet in the purchase of American goods and services. It was “managed trade.”

China did not meet its obligations. Until a few months ago, China had fulfilled about 62% of its commitments. That means they dishonored this deal materially and significantly. If anything, China broke its Phase One commitments.

We should increase the tariffs that President Trump imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Remember that those tariffs are meant to remedy the theft of American intellectual property. China has continued stealing American intellectual property. In fact, it got worse: for example, these Chinese anti-suit injunctions, which they began to institute.

We have to do something: China steals between $300 billion and $600 billion of American intellectual property every year. It is a serious wound to the American economy, it is a serious wound to our society as a whole. We have to do something about it.

Question: As a follow-up, Japan began World War II because of the tariffs Roosevelt imposed on oil imports into Japan. Do you think it could have the same effect on China, where we begin imposing harsher tariffs on U.S. imports?

Chang: That is a really important question, to which nobody has an answer. I do not think China is going to start a war over tariffs. Let me answer this question another way. We are Americans. Naturally, we assume there are solutions, and good solutions, to every problem. After three decades of really mistaken China policy, there are no good solutions. There are no solutions that are “low-danger.”

Every solution, going forward, carries great risk. The current policy trend is unsustainable. There will be no American republic if we keep doing what we are doing and if we keep allowing China to do what it does.

I do not think enforcing a trade deal is going to start World War III. The point is that we have no other option at this moment. In the first place, I do not think the Chinese are going to comply with the Phase One deal. This was not a deal with some fuzzy requirements. This deal was very clear: China buys these quantities of agricultural products by such a date, China buys this many manufactured goods by such a date. It was not rocket science. China deliberately decided not to comply.

There are also other issues related to the trade deal. I do not think we should try to encourage Wall Street’s integration into China’s markets, which is also what the Phase One deal contemplated. Goldman Sachs ran away like a bandit with that. There are many objections to it. I do not think we should trade with China, for many reasons. The Phase One trade deal, in my opinion, was a big mistake. Do not take my word for it, just look at their failure to meet very simple and easy requirements. It was a mistake.

Question: Regarding cybersecurity, as we saw with the recent departure of a Pentagon official, sounding the alarm about how we are completely vulnerable to cyberattacks from China. From your point of view, what would an attack on China that hurt them look like? Which specific institutions would be the most vulnerable? Is it about exposing their secrets? Is it something in their financial system? Is it something in their medical system or in their critical infrastructure? What is the best way to hurt them?

Also, regarding what you mentioned about Afghanistan, we know that China has been making inroads in Pakistan as a check on American hegemony in relations with India and Afghanistan.

Now that the Afghan domino has fallen, what do you see in the future for Pakistan’s nuclear capability, together with Chinese backing, moving further west toward Afghanistan and endangering Middle East security?

Chang: Right now, India has been discouraged by what happened, because India was one of the main supporters of the Afghan government. What we did in New Delhi was to delegitimize our friends, so that now the pro-Russian and pro-Chinese elements of the Indian national security establishment are basically setting the tone. This is terrible.

However, what has happened in Pakistan is not an absolute disaster for us, because China has suffered a setback there. There is an Afghan Taliban and a Pakistani Taliban. They have diametrically opposed policies regarding China. The Afghan Taliban are allies of China; the Pakistani Taliban kill Chinese.

They do it because they want to destabilize Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. Beijing supports Islamabad. The Pakistani Taliban’s calculation is: “We kill Chinese, we destabilize Islamabad, and then we get to establish the caliphate in Pakistan.” What has happened is that, with this incredible success of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban have been reinvigorated, which is not good news for China.

China has something called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Ultimately, it will involve an investment of about $62 billion in Pakistani roads, airports, power plants, utilities and everything else.

I am very glad China is in Pakistan, because now it faces a situation for which it has no solutions. It is like Winston Churchill in Italy: “Now it is your turn.”

We should never have had good relations with Pakistan. That was always a short-term commitment that, even in the short term, undermined American interests. The point is that China now has problems in Pakistan because of its success in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is important to China for several reasons. One is that they want it as an outlet to the Indian Ocean that bypasses the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint that the U.S. Navy, in their view, could easily close, which is correct.

They want to avoid it, but their port at Gwadar is a failure in many respects. Gwadar is in Pakistani Balochistan. The Baloch are one of the most oppressed minorities on the planet. They have now turned to violence against the Chinese, and they have been effective. Pakistan is a failure for China.

The best response would be to hit them with everything at once because China right now is weak. If we had to choose the first thing to do, I would think of trade.

Trade is really what they need right now. Their economy is stagnant. The Chinese economy has three parts, like all economies: consumption, investment and net exports. Their consumption right now is extremely weak according to the indicators we have. The question is whether they can invest.

China now has a debt crisis, so they are not going to invest their way out of this crisis, which means the only way to save their economy is net exports. We should stop buying their stuff.

Right now we have extraordinary supply chain disruptions. It should be fairly easy for us to argue that we must be self-sufficient in a number of items. Hit them on trade. Hit them on investment, publish the bank account details of Chinese leaders. All these things we do, we do them all at the same time. Maybe we can get rid of these guys.

Question: In the Solomon Islands, they published China’s under-the-table payments to political figures. Should we do the same with Chinese leaders?

Chang: Yes. There is now a competition for the Solomon Islands, which includes Guadalcanal. China has bought off the Solomon Islands’ political class, except for one brave man named David Suidani. Recently, someone had the brilliant idea of publishing all the specific payments Beijing has made to Solomon Islands politicians. This was very good news. We should do this with payments to American politicians, we should do it across the board.

Why do we not publish their payments to politicians all over the world? Let us expose these guys, let us go after them. Let us eliminate Chinese influence, because they are subverting our political system.

Likewise, we should also publish the bank account details of all these Chinese leaders, because they are very corrupt.

Question: Could you comment, please, on what you think is the nature of the personal relationships between Hunter Biden, his father, and Chinese financial institutions? How has it affected, if at all, U.S. foreign policy toward China, and how will it affect that policy?

Chang: There are two things here. There are the financial ties. Hunter Biden has connections with Chinese institutions that cannot be explained unless there is corruption.

For example, he has a relationship with Bohai Harvest Partners, BHR. China puts a lot of money in the care of foreign investment managers. The two billion, or whatever the figure is, is not that large, but they only put the money with people who have a track record in investment management. Hunter Biden only has the track record of being Joe Biden’s son.

There are three investigations into Hunter Biden right now. There is the Wilmington prosecutor’s office, the FBI (I am not very hopeful about either of them), but the third could bear some fruit: the IRS investigation into Hunter Biden.

Let us say, for the moment, that Biden is able to corrupt these three investigations. However, money always leaves a trail. We are going to find out one way or another. Peter Schweizer, for example, is working on a book about Biden’s money. Eventually, we are going to know about it.

What worries me is not so much the money trail (and of course, there is the art sale, a subject in itself, because we will find out). What worries me is that Hunter Biden, by his own admission, is a troubled individual.

He has been to China several times. He probably committed some embarrassing act there, which means the Ministry of State Security has audio and video recordings of it. Those are things that can be used for blackmail. We Americans would never know, because blackmail does not necessarily leave a trail. This is what should worry us most.

Biden has already had two long phone calls with Xi Jinping. The February call, and also one a few months ago. We do not know what was said. I would be very worried that when Xi Jinping wants to say something, there is a phone call to Biden, and it is Xi who speaks without taking notes.

Question: Tell us about the China office over the 30 years, about the influence of the bureaucracy on policy; in what ways can they affect it?

Chang: I disagree with the establishment of our China policy in Washington in general, and specifically at the State Department and the NSC.

It is a complicated issue. In the first place, there was this notion, after the end of the Cold War, that the nature of governments did not matter. You could trade with them, you could strengthen them, and that would have no national security implications. That was wrong for a number of reasons, as we are seeing now.

What bothers me is that, even though their assumptions about China have been proven wrong, American policymakers continue with the same policies. There is, in the minds of some people, an unshakable view that we have to cooperate with China.

You hear this from Blinken all the time: “We have to cooperate where we can.” It is this formulation that is tired, and that has not produced the kinds of policies that are needed to defend our republic. That is the unfortunate part.

This is what people learn in international relations school when they go to Georgetown, and it becomes totally stupid. We Americans should be upset because we have a political class that does not defend us. They do not defend us because they have these notions about China. George Kennan understood the nature of the Soviet Union. I do not understand why we cannot understand the true nature of the Chinese regime.

Partly it is because we have Wall Street, we have Walmart, and they carry China’s water. There are more of us than of them in this country. We have to exercise our vote to make sure we implement policies for China that actually protect us.

The policies that protect us are going to be drastic and extreme, but absolutely, we have now gotten ourselves into such a big hole after three decades of really mistaken views on China that I do not know what else to say. This is not a partisan complaint. Liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, all have really mistaken China policies. I do not know what it will take to break this view, except perhaps the deaths of American servicemembers.

Question: Is the big obstacle American businesses that, in their donations to Biden, are the ones preventing decoupling from trade, saying: “Let us not make war; we would rather make money”?

Chang: It is. You have, for example, Nike. There are a number of different companies, but Nike comes to mind right now, because they love lecturing us about racism.

For years they had a factory in Qingdao, in northeastern China, that looked like a concentration camp. The workers were Uyghur and Kazakh women, brought there in cattle cars and forced to work.

This factory, technically, was operated by a South Korean subcontractor, but that contractor had a three-decade relationship with Nike. Nike had to know what was going on. This was forced labor, perhaps even slave labor.

Clearly, Nike and Apple and other companies are now, at this very moment, trying to keep Congress from enacting stricter rules on the import of forced-labor products into our country.

One of the good things Trump did was, toward the end of his four years, to begin vigorously enforcing the statutes already on the books regarding products made with forced and slave labor. Biden, to his credit, has continued with stricter enforcement.

Right now, the big fight is not enforcement, but improving those rules. Apple and all these companies are now trying to prevent the amendment of those laws. It is business, but it is also immoral.

Question: It is not just the big Wall Street companies. There are companies that print the Bible. Most Bibles are now printed in China.

When President Trump imposed the tariffs, many of the Bible printers that depended on China actually went to Trump and said: “You cannot put those tariffs on because then the cost of Bibles will go up.”

Chang: Almost everyone lobbies in favor of China. We have to take away their incentive to do so.

Question: What are the chances that China will invade Taiwan?

Chang: There is no clear answer.

There are a number of factors that favor stability. One is that, for China to invade Taiwan, Xi Jinping has to give some general or admiral basically total control of the Chinese military. That makes this flag officer the most powerful person in China. Xi is not willing to do that.

In addition, the Chinese regime is even more casualty-averse than we are. Even if Beijing believes it can take Taiwan by force, it probably will not invade because it knows an invasion would be unpopular with most people in China. It is not going to risk the hundreds of thousands of casualties an invasion would cause.

The reason we should be concerned is that it is not just a matter of Xi Jinping waking up one morning and saying: “I want to invade Taiwan.” The danger is the risk of accidental contact, in the skies or on the seas, around Taiwan.

We know China has engaged in hostile conduct, and it is not just the incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. There are also dangerous intercepts of U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft and ships worldwide. One of those accidents could spin out of control.

We saw it on April 1, 2001, with the EP-3, when a Chinese plane collided with the wing of that slow U.S. Navy propeller plane. The only reason we got through it was that George W. Bush, to his eternal shame, paid China a sum that was essentially a ransom.

He allowed our crew to be held for 11 days. He allowed the Chinese to strip the aircraft. This was a mistake. This was the worst incident in the diplomatic history of the United States, but Bush’s cowardly response allowed us to get past it. Unfortunately, by getting past it we taught the Chinese that they can carry out these dangerous intercept maneuvers against our aircraft and our ships at no cost.

That is the problem: because we have taught the Chinese to be more aggressive, they have been. One of these incidents will go wrong. The law of averages says so. Then we will have to really worry.

Question: Do you not think Xi thinks: “Oh well, we can sacrifice a few million Chinese”?

Chang: On the night of June 15, 2020, there was a clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers in Ladakh, in the Galwan Valley. It was a Chinese sneak attack in Indian-controlled territory. That night 20 Indian soldiers died. China did not admit to any casualties. The Indians said they had killed about 45 Chinese soldiers that night.

Remember, this was June 15, 2020. We had to wait until February 2021 for China to admit that four Chinese soldiers had died. TASS, the Russian news agency, recently ran a story reporting that 45 Chinese soldiers really did die that night.

This incident shows the Chinese Communist Party’s aversion to risk and casualties. They are willing to intimidate, they are willing to do all kinds of things. However, they are reluctant to fight in sustained engagements. Remember that the number one goal of Chinese foreign policy is not to seize Taiwan. The number one goal of Chinese foreign policy is to preserve Communist Party rule.

If the Communist Party feels the Chinese people do not agree with an invasion of Taiwan, it will not do it even if it believes it will succeed. Right now, the Chinese people are not in the mood for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

On the other hand, Xi Jinping has a very low risk threshold. He took a consensus political system in which no Chinese leader had too much blame or too much credit, because everyone shared the decisions, and Xi took power from everyone, which means he ended up with full accountability, which means he is now fully responsible.

Ned Price could not tell the truth because Xi Jinping did not agree with the U.S. position on Taiwan. That is clear. There is total confusion or a barefaced lie in the Biden administration about this.

Biden’s policies on Taiwan are not horrible, but they are not appropriate for this moment either. For decades, we have had this policy of “strategic ambiguity,” in which we do not tell either side what we would do in the face of an imminent conflict. That worked in a benign period. We are no longer in a benign period. We are in one of the most dangerous periods in history.

We need a policy of “strategic clarity,” in which we tell China that we will defend Taiwan. We also say that we will extend a mutual defense treaty to Taiwan if it wants one, and that we will put U.S. troops on the island as a tripwire.

In 2017, when everything was going China’s way, this was great for Xi Jinping because he took all the credit. Now, in 2021, when things are not going China’s way, he takes all the blame.

The other thing is that Xi has raised the cost of losing a political fight in China. In the Deng Xiaoping era, Deng lowered the cost of losing a fight. In the Maoist era, if you lost a fight, you could lose your life. In the Deng era, if you lost a fight, you got a nice house, a comfortable life.

Xi Jinping has reversed that. Now the cost of losing a political fight in China is very high. So there is now a combination of these two developments. Xi has full responsibility. He knows that if he is ousted from power, he does not just lose power. He loses his freedom, his assets, potentially his life.

However, if he has nothing to lose, it means he can start a war, whether “accidentally” or on purpose. He might be thinking: “I am going to die anyway, so why not roll the dice and see if I can get out of this?”

That is why this moment is so excessively risky. If you look at China’s internal dynamics right now, we are looking at a system in crisis.

Question: China has a conference in a year or so. What does President Xi want to do to make sure he comes out of that conference triumphant?

Chang: The Communist Party has recently been holding its National Congresses once every five years. If the pattern holds (and it is an “if”), the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party will be held in October or November next year.

This is an important Congress, more than most of them, because Xi Jinping is seeking an unprecedented third term as general secretary of the Communist Party.

If we go back six months, maybe a year, everyone was saying: “Oh, Xi Jinping. No problem. He is president for life. He is going to get his third term. He will get his fourth term. He will get his fifth term, as long as he lives. This guy is there forever.” Right now, that assumption is no longer valid. We do not know what is going to happen because he is being blamed for everything.

Remember, as we approach the 20th National Congress, Xi Jinping knows he has to show “success.” Showing “success” could well mean killing a few more Indians or killing Americans or killing Japanese or something like that. We just do not know what is going to happen.

Before the National Congress, there is the sixth plenum of the 19th Congress. Who knows what is going to happen there. The Communist Party calendar, as you point out, dictates the way Xi Jinping interacts with the world.

Question: Going back to the paperclip incident, what should Bush have done?

Chang: What Bush should have done is immediately demand the return of that plane. What he should have done is impose trade sanctions, investment sanctions, whatever, to get our plane back.

We were lucky, in the sense that our aviators were returned, but they were returned in a way that has worsened relations with China, because we taught the Chinese regime to be more aggressive and more belligerent. We created the problems of today and tomorrow.

I would have imposed sanction after sanction after sanction, and simply demanded that they return the plane and the pilots. Remember that, at some point, it suited China to return our aviators. The costs would have been too high for the Chinese to keep them. We did not use that leverage over them.

Since we are on this subject, we should have made clear to Chinese leaders that they cannot kill Americans at no cost. Hundreds of thousands of Americans have died from a disease that China deliberately spread.

In one year, from 2020 to 2021, almost 80,000 Americans died from fentanyl, which China has sold on purpose, as a matter of state and Communist Party policy, to Americans. China is killing us. We have to do something different. I am not saying we have good solutions; we do not. But we have to change course.

Question: Biden continues with this hostage business with Huawei, returning Huawei’s chief financial officer in exchange for two Canadians. Have we taught the Chinese that they can take more hostages?

Chang: President Trump was right to seek the extradition of Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of Huawei Technologies. Biden, in a deal, released her. She did not even have to plead guilty to any federal crime. She signed a statement, which I hope we can use against Huawei.

As soon as Meng was released, China released the “two Michaels,” the two Canadians who were seized within days of our requesting Meng Wanzhou’s extradition. In other words, the two Michaels were hostages.

We have taught China that every time we try to enforce our own laws, they can simply grab Americans. They have taken Americans hostage before, but this case is high profile. They took Americans, and then they took Canadians, and they got away with it. They are going to do it again.

We are creating the incentives for Beijing to act in even more dangerous, illegal and criminal ways in the future. This has to stop.

Question: In the event that the current leader does not hold on to his position, what do you think of the leaders we should be paying attention to?

Chang: There is no one who stands out among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee. That is intentional. Xi Jinping has made sure there is no one who could be considered a successor; that is the last thing he wants.

If there is a change in leadership, the new leader will probably come from the Shanghai Gang faction of Jiang Zemin. Jiang was the leader of China before Hu Jintao, and Hu was before Xi Jinping.

There is now a lot of infighting among factions. Most reports show that Jiang has been trying to oust Xi Jinping because Xi has been putting Jiang’s allies in prison.

Remember that the Communist Party is not a monolith. It has many factions. Jiang’s faction is not the only one. There is something called Hu Jintao’s Communist Youth League. So it could be anyone.

Question: Double question: You have not talked about Hong Kong. Is Hong Kong lost forever to the Chinese Communist Party? Second question: if you could, what are the three policies you would change immediately?

Chang: Hong Kong is not lost forever. There is an insurgency in Hong Kong. We know from the history of insurgencies that they die out and come back. We have seen it in Hong Kong. The great protests in Hong Kong, remember, 2003, 2014, 2019. In those intervening periods, everyone said: “Oh, the protest movement is gone.” It was not.

China has been very effective with its national security law, but there is still resistance in Hong Kong. There is still a lot of struggle there. It may not show for quite some time, but this struggle is not over, especially if the United States supports the people there. Biden, although he campaigned on helping Hong Kong, has done nothing.

As for the second issue, I would close the four consulates China has left. I would also reduce the Chinese embassy to the ambassador and his staff. The thousands of people who are in Washington, DC, would be out.

I would also raise tariffs to 3,600%, or whatever. This is a good time to do it. We have supply chain disruptions. We are not getting products from China anyway. We can start doing this kind of thing.

The third thing, I would do what Pompeo did, just hit those guys verbally all the time. People may think: “It is just words.” For the Communists, words are really important, because they are an insecure regime in which propaganda is absolutely critical.

I would go after the Communists on human rights, go after them on the occupation of the South China Sea, on Taiwan, relentlessly, because I would want to show the world that the United States is no longer afraid of China.

We have taught the world that we are afraid to deal with the Chinese. The people at the State Department are scared. We have to tell the Chinese regime, like Dulles: “I am not afraid of you. I am coming after you and I am going to win.”

Gordon G. Chang is a columnist, author and lawyer. He is the author of The Coming Collapse of China.

Source: Gordon Chang Published by Gatestone Institute on May 1, 2022.

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