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What China’s ‘Zero COVID’ Policy Hides: Part I

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The COVID-19 pandemic has been ravaging the world for more than two years. Governments around the world have been testing strategies to manage the disease. More and more nations have opted for a policy of relaxing restrictions and coexisting with the virus. Against this trend, the Chinese government has stood firm in carrying out its “Zero COVID” strategy.

Beijing’s “Zero COVID” strategy is a vigorous practice of quarantine and community lockdown in which, after a given case of COVID-19 is identified, authorities force all residents of the vicinity, which can range from a few blocks to a district or an entire city, to stay inside their homes for a long period of time. These lockdowns can last from several days to several weeks or, in some cases, even months.

The core of this approach is “controlling people.” The virus is invisible and does not follow the orders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), so the CCP opts to control the people it can give orders to. However, it is questionable whether the CCP can use the lockdown method to win its battle against COVID, especially today, when the Omicron variant can spread at a much faster rate. In any case, that is a different topic that we will not discuss here.

READ ALSO: WHO Investigation in Wuhan: Conflicts of Interest and Lack of Transparency

No other large country has been able to achieve isolation as complete as the CCP’s. Many Western countries attempted similar isolation approaches in the past, but only China seems to have succeeded in implementing “Zero COVID.” One reason for this disparity is that the free world, with its respect for freedom and human rights, was unable to sacrifice its citizens’ rights so completely. By contrast, the CCP was willing to sacrifice not only its citizens’ rights, but sometimes even their lives.

There are other countries in the world that do not respect human rights and impose iron control on their citizens, such as North Korea, but only China developed a comprehensive system of control and surveillance of its citizens. This sophisticated population control mechanism, which the CCP built over several decades, is a key ingredient in suppressing dissent and disobedience in China around the “Zero COVID” policy. In this analysis, we examine the CCP’s numerous citizen control mechanisms and their use so far in the COVID era.

I. China’s “Zero COVID” Approach

The CCP’s “Zero COVID” policy involves:

  • Enforcing strict control over international travel
  • Isolating confirmed and suspected COVID patients in high-security quarantine centers or heavily isolated makeshift hospitals, with the isolation continuing until the patient recovers or dies
  • Total lockdown with strict home quarantines of cities or neighborhoods where COVID cases have occurred, and
  • Ongoing mass mandatory COVID testing.

When COVID-19 first appeared in Wuhan, China, the Chinese government locked down the city for 76 days (from January 23 to April 8, 2020). Since the beginning of this period in early 2020, Beijing imposed strict control over travel to China:

  • Since March 28, 2020, China closed its doors to non-essential foreigners.
  • To enter China, Chinese citizens must show negative results on a COVID test taken within 72 hours before boarding a plane to China.
  • All incoming passengers must quarantine for at least 14 days in the city of their arrival.
  • After the 14 days of quarantine in the initial arrival city, if the passenger continues their trip within China, they must quarantine again in their destination city for another period, usually 7 to 14 days. Local governments may impose longer quarantines. The city of Shenyang, for example, requires a total of 56 (28+28) days of quarantine.

Inside China, a community-level lockdown means:

  • Community gates are closed and locked. No one can enter or leave except designated personnel or those with special permission. Enforcing these travel restrictions is feasible because residential communities in China are typically built with a wall surrounding the apartment buildings.
  • Residents are forced to remain inside their homes until the quarantine is lifted. In many cases, the authorities will place a seal on the door of each home. If a resident opens their door from the inside, the seal will break, resulting in severe punishment. At times, the authorities installed video cameras to monitor residential doors.
  • Residents may be allowed to order food or medicine online (if available). However, there were many reports of insufficient or entirely nonexistent supplies.
  • In some cities, each family may have been allowed to send one person to buy supplies once every several days.
  • In the countryside, authorities put up fences on village roads or block roads so that no one can enter or leave. In a village on the outskirts of the city of Xi’an, Shaanxi province, the CCP village leader even welded shut the door of a local family to keep them from leaving.

Beijing ordered everyone to install a mandatory health code smartphone app (健康码). The app is used for COVID tracing; the government sets each resident’s health code to one of three colors depending on the person’s estimated risk of COVID exposure. This process is automated using phone location tracking and big data analysis, although the authorities can manually intervene to change someone’s health code. Police and guards at stores and other establishments check the color of each customer’s health code app, and decide on that basis whether to allow the person to enter or leave. The colors are:

  • Green: the phone holder has a normal health status and does not need to be quarantined.
  • Yellow: the phone holder was possibly exposed to a COVID patient: the CCP’s big data analysis determines that the phone holder was in the same place and at about the same time as a COVID patient. The person is usually required to take a COVID test and is not allowed to enter public facilities.
  • Red: there is a significant probability that the phone holder is infected with COVID and, therefore, the person must be quarantined.

An example of forced quarantine occurred at a Shanghai supermarket, where a customer was shopping when his Health Code app turned red. After he was taken away, all the customers in the store were locked in and forced to quarantine in the supermarket for a period of two weeks. An online photo showing customers sleeping on the store floor was viewed more than 220 million times.

Some medical patients, who could not receive treatment at a hospital because of the strict enforcement of stay-at-home orders, suffered or died; many died of treatable conditions such as heart disease, the need for kidney dialysis or pregnancy.

For example, Dr. Yaqiong Xu, a physics professor at Vanderbilt University, lost her life in late October 2021. She was diagnosed with rectal cancer in early October and decided to travel from her residence in the United States to her hometown, Wuhan, for treatment. Upon arriving in China, she had to quarantine at the port of arrival, the city of Dongguan, Guangdong province, for 14 days; although she informed the authorities that she was a cancer patient and needed to go to a hospital as soon as possible, no special measures were taken. After the quarantine, Dr. Xu traveled to Wuhan, where she was again required to undergo a second quarantine. She died in late October, right after completing the two consecutive quarantine periods without any substantial medical treatment.

In fact, the CCP’s strict enforcement of quarantines is inhumane; it caused many human tragedies. If these incidents occurred in Western countries, people would protest in the streets, forcing the government to change its policy, but then again, a Western government would not adopt such a policy in the first place.

We now ask ourselves: how has the CCP been able to carry out these cruel policies without provoking major public protest? In July 2020, Dr. Zhang Wenhong, the leading medical expert in Shanghai’s anti-COVID task force, said that China’s government was able to enforce the “Zero COVID” policy because of two unique characteristics: “strong community management capacity” and “great cooperation of the whole society.” In other words, the CCP exercises strict control over its citizens, and the Chinese people became accustomed to yielding to the CCP after having been coerced and brainwashed for so long.

In the next sections we will look at the wide repertoire of means the CCP can employ to control the Chinese people.

II. The CCP’s Power Base: The Party and Its Affiliated Organizations

To justify its right to rule China, the CCP cites its victory in the military battles of 1949, which ended the Chinese Civil War. This idea has been in use for decades. Mao Zedong, the founder of the CCP, famously expressed that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun (枪杆子里面出政权).” By exercising iron control over the Chinese army, the CCP has no qualms about declaring that it has the right to reign over China.

Today, the CCP has about 4.7 million affiliated organizations throughout China, with more than 95 million members. That is about 8.5% of China’s adult population. These CCP members hold all leadership positions and most ordinary posts at all levels of government. The CCP Central Committee controls the central government, and the head of the CCP Central Committee [the general secretary] holds the title of president of China. Every local government or ministerial body has a parallel structure: the CCP party committee and the administrative office. The party committee has the power to appoint officials and places the administrative head as a deputy of the party committee, so that the head of the party committee is the highest. In addition, the party controls all elections and legislative bodies in China. Thus, the CCP positioned itself to control the Chinese government.

The CCP has a helper: it is closely affiliated with the Communist Youth League (CYL), an organization with more than 81 million members between the ages of 14 and 28. The normal path for a Chinese person to obtain CCP membership is to first join the CYL and then the CCP. Like CCP members, key members of the Communist Youth League can hold important positions at all levels of government, schools, companies, institutions and the military.

In today’s China, the privilege of being a government official motivates many people to join the CYL and then the CCP. The benefits of being affiliated with these organizations, both visible and invisible, illegal and legal, attract many people hoping for a better career path.

Unlike members of political parties in the United States, CCP and CYL members are required to participate in regular political study and actively follow the CCP’s guidelines. At the induction ceremony for the CCP or the CYL, new members must swear to be loyal to the communist organization and to dedicate their lives to the communist cause, including in all social activities. Just as the Hitler Youth helped the Nazi Party in Hitler’s Germany, the CYL has been of great help to the CCP. Like the Nazi Party, the CCP claims that its work is done “for the people.”

In addition to the CCP, there are eight legally recognized minor political parties in China. These include parties such as the “China Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party,” the “China Democratic League” and the “Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.” These auxiliary parties have a combined membership of fewer than 1.3 million, and each “voluntarily” accepted the CCP’s leadership. This point is imposed in the party constitutions and frequently repeated in public.

Why do the members of these auxiliary parties not simply join the CCP? These parties serve a purpose. The CCP calls them “democratic parties.” They show the world that China has “democracy.” The leaders of some of these parties are allowed to hold positions on the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, but their suggestions are ignored. Thus, these auxiliary parties are mere “decorative flower vases.” The leaders of some of these parties are in turn CCP members.

For example, the “Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League” is one of these eight parties. It has about 3,000 members. The CCP uses this party to promote its attempt to claim Taiwan as mainland Chinese territory.

The CCP also legally recognized five religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Islam and Protestantism. Within China, the CCP controls the practice of these religions and they are subject to the CCP’s “leadership.” Little religious freedom is allowed. For example, the CCP dissolved Protestant churches that had close ties to religious groups in the United States, establishing in their place the new “Three-Self Patriotic Protestant Church Organization.” The “three selves” refer to “self-governance,” “self-support” and “self-propagation.”

Most of the leaders of China’s official religious associations are CCP members, although this is not usually announced to the public. One example is Wang Zheyi, secretary general of the Taoist Association of China. When he was detained for unspecified crimes in 2015, it was revealed that he is a CCP party secretary. This meant that the Taoist Association, under Wang’s leadership, functioned as a branch of the CCP.

These religious associations are political in nature, rather than spiritual. Instead of carrying out serious religious activities, they actively advocate for religious practitioners to follow and support the CCP. This meant, for example, that CCP-approved Christianity is very different from that practiced elsewhere in the world. Authentic religions, such as true Christianity and Falun Gong, help their members focus on spiritual development: revering the divine, improving their morality and becoming good people. The CCP tries to crush such spiritual practice in China, attaching labels such as “backed by foreign forces” or “evil cult,” and the CCP perpetrates a brutal persecution against practitioners.

In China, the CCP and its affiliated youth organization, the CYL, are the only real political powers. Their members hold all positions of importance in the private and public sectors, and control all the “democratic parties” and “religious associations” in the country. These CCP and CYL officials are the backbone that allows the CCP to implement its policies in China, including the strict lockdowns and the inhumane “Zero COVID” policy.

All levels of government and their pseudo-democratic facades participate in maintaining the CCP’s multi-layered totalitarian control system. The “People’s Republic of China” is not really the people’s China; it is the CCP’s China.

III. The CCP’s “Hard Weapons”

Chinese people often say that the CCP maintains power through three things: “the gun,” “the knife” and “the pen.” The “gun” is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); “the knife” consists of the armed police, the unarmed police and the components of the judicial system; and “the pen” refers to the CCP’s propaganda machinery. The CCP’s hard weapons are “the gun,” “the knife” and other mechanisms that allow it to control the citizenry. The CCP’s soft weapons include its “pen,” as well as its various Internet control apparatuses.

A. The CCP’s “Gun”: The PLA

The PLA has 2.3 million active troops, the largest number of military personnel of any country in the world. China also has more than 10 million PLA soldiers in reserve. The CCP’s Central Military Commission can call these reserves into action when necessary. Just as CCP members hold all the important posts in China’s government, CCP members also hold all the leadership positions in the PLA. The PLA is, in effect, the CCP’s army. Its sole purpose is to defend, maintain and carry out the CCP’s directives and it did not hesitate to kill civilians to defend the CCP’s interests.

This is exactly what happened during the infamous ‘Tiananmen Square Massacre’ of June 4, 1989. The PLA followed the CCP’s orders. It shot and killed thousands of protesters in Tiananmen Square and in neighboring areas of Beijing. As always, the CCP denied and covered up this incident and hid information about the victims. In the fall of 2021, a detailed death count of the June 4 incident was made public: there were 10,974 students, 7,992 citizens and 11,865 unidentified and other people, in total 31,978 civilians who died at the hands of the “People’s Liberation Army.”

During the Wuhan lockdown in 2020 and 2021, the PLA deployed 9,000 soldiers from six garrisons, including the army, the air force and other military units. In February 2020, these armed forces quickly built 14 makeshift hospitals with more than 12,000 beds, an act that earned worldwide recognition. While this sounded like an impressive and rapid response aimed at containing the COVID-19 virus, a closer look painted a troubling picture of the facilities they built.

First, the authorities and the PLA quarantined not only COVID patients, but also those who were not infected with COVID, including those who simply had a fever or a runny nose. Once a person was locked in the containment facility, they could not leave and visits were ruled out. The makeshift hospitals looked like extermination camps. Leaked videos showed inhumane living conditions, which included little (or no) heating, little or no food distribution and a severe shortage of medical personnel and supplies. These were “hospitals” in name only. In essence, they were more like extermination camps. It is not known how many people died in these “hospitals.” The CCP simply “zeroed out” the number.

On July 1, 2020, the CCP Central Military Commission announced that the PLA reserves were under its direct command. Since then, many members of the PLA reserve force participated in enforcing the “Zero COVID” strategy. These reservists worked alongside other local volunteers at checkpoints and on patrols in cities throughout China.

On December 28, 2021, a video appeared showing a man wearing a “PLA veteran” armband forcefully pushing a young, pretty woman dressed in red who was trying to pass through the gate of a community checkpoint. The man was wearing an official PLA uniform. He may be a PLA reservist. The video was taken down shortly after being uploaded, and another video was put in its place. This new video showed a woman in a black coat who blocked, but did not push, the woman in red. A statement below the video said the video was recorded in October and that the woman in red had a mental illness. Why was the original video replaced? Did the CCP simply want to hide that a man pushed the woman, or was its goal to hide that PLA reserve forces participated in community-level lockdowns in China?

B. The CCP’s “Knives”

B-1. The Armed Police

In 1982, the CCP created the “Chinese People’s Armed Police Force,” with more than 1.5 million soldiers. The armed police’s responsibilities include maintaining internal security, riot control and counterterrorism. Like the PLA, despite having “People’s” in its name, the “People’s Armed Police Force” is, in reality, the CCP’s Armed Police Force against the people.

Consider some historical incidents involving China’s armed police.

In March 1989, widespread protests broke out in Lhasa, Tibet, in opposition to Beijing’s takeover of the region. To quell the opposition, the CCP created a meticulous 8-level action plan. The fifth layer consisted of dedicating a team of 300 spy agents to infiltrate Lhasa’s citizenry and pose as monks. These Chinese provocateurs entered Bakuo Street in downtown Lhasa. They burned the Jing Pagoda at the Jokhang Temple and incited a mob to loot grain warehouses and attack the Tibetan-Gansu Trading Company. The authorities were able to capture excellent video footage of the ensuing violence, which was used as fodder for the CCP’s propaganda machinery. Apparently, the riots had become violent and out of control, and the CCP was able to justify the use of the armed police to immediately suppress them.

Similar events were repeated in Lhasa in March 2008. According to one account, 20 men set cars on fire and looted shops. The men were not locals and were exceptionally well organized. Who were they? In another account, a Thai woman who was at the Lhasa police station at the time recalls a very peculiar scene among a group of men detained as part of a frenzied mob. One person in the mob, with a knife in his hand, identified himself as a police officer and changed from civilian clothes into a police uniform. During her interview with the BBC, this woman was even able to identify the police officer within the mob who appeared in a video broadcast by the CCP’s China Central Television (CCTV). The footage from the CCTV segment was removed from the web after the BBC aired its interview with this witness.

On the night of July 5, 2009, in the city of Urumqi, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, a protest of several hundred Uyghurs opposing government policies turned into a riot. The armed police were deployed to suppress the violence. The authorities cut off Internet service in the region, and the state-controlled media bombarded the public throughout China with accusations against the Uyghurs of East Turkestan. The Uyghurs were labeled terrorists; the media circulated the story that the Uyghurs attacked and killed Han people, thus justifying the armed police’s actions.

Maris Alimas, a refugee from Xinjiang who escaped to Europe shortly after the riots, worked at People’s Hospital No. 2 during the riots. She witnessed that, at the side door of the hospital, five or six young Uyghurs were chased into an alley by a couple hundred young Han men. These young Han men all had the same style of haircut, and all had the same type of wooden club in their hands. When the armed police appeared at the other end of the alley, the Han group quickly withdrew and the Uyghurs were shot down by the armed police. Ms. Alimas says the armed police ordered the hospital not to provide medical care to the Uyghurs who were dying in the alley, and that the hospital’s CCP chief threatened to fire her if she disobeyed by providing medical assistance.

Rebiya Kadeer, spokeswoman for the World Uyghur Congress, denounced the activities of CCP agents provocateurs who posed as Uyghurs during the 2009 riots: “These undercover agents, well organized, mixed with the protesters, incited violence, provoked the police and provoked the protesters to attack the police.” During a press conference in Japan, she condemned the CCP’s “assault squads” that kidnapped Uyghurs, leading to the disappearance of approximately 10,000 Uyghurs throughout the region. She urged international human rights groups to thoroughly investigate the facts of the ongoing Uyghur genocide.

Since then, the CCP has built more than 380 detention centers in Xinjiang. More than 2 million Uyghurs are locked in these forced labor camps, being forced to work in cotton fields and textile factories. This widespread slavery and mistreatment of the Uyghurs led the entire world to condemn the CCP’s genocide and human rights violations, resulting in the recent boycott of Xinjiang cotton.

Similar events were observed during the Hong Kong protests of 2019-2020: some organized mobs were found to speak Mandarin (the language used in mainland China) and could not speak Cantonese (the language used in Hong Kong). Similarly, some police officers who suppressed these protests in Hong Kong spoke Mandarin among themselves and did not answer citizens’ questions asked in Cantonese; their police uniforms did not show the police identification mandatory for all Hong Kong police officers: people believe these are mainland Chinese armed police sent by the CCP.

The examples mentioned illustrate a proven tactic of the armed police: the infiltration of peaceful and legitimate dissident groups in order to incite violence to justify the CCP’s harsh crackdown. This armed police force was responsible for turning many peaceful protests into riots, posing as protesters and perpetrating criminal acts. In essence, the armed police are a well-organized group of crisis actors and an essential resource for sculpting public opinion, a tool for gaining public support when taking lethal action against the country’s own citizenry, and a “knife” that delivers precise and ruthless blows against the CCP’s enemies under the pretext of “protecting the people.”

In implementing China’s “Zero COVID” policy, several hundred thousand armed police were deployed to seal off airports, railway stations and roads entering and leaving cities that were locked down, preventing people from entering and leaving. The same armed police force was also responsible for sealing off sensitive areas, such as the makeshift hospitals mentioned above. Knowing the capabilities of the armed police and their past actions against peaceful citizens, one wonders: how many atrocities were perpetrated against those citizens suspected of being infected with COVID?

B-2. Police

The CCP has two million regular police officers, called “People’s Police.” It also has four million “auxiliary police” and at least one million “assistant police.” Including the armed police, the CCP employs more than 8.5 million police officers to “maintain internal security,” that is, to monitor and repress China’s citizens.

As more and more CCP officials expand their privileges to gain power and fortune, most became corrupt and plundered the people’s interests. CCP oppression caused tens of thousands of “mass incidents” (群体事件) every year. These “mass incidents” are not organized protests, but spontaneous reactions in which a group of people confront local authorities, sometimes escalating to riots. In 2010 there were a total of 180,000 such mass incidents, according to the estimates of Professor Sun Liping. To suppress these spontaneous protests, the CCP regime frequently resorts to police forces, armed or not, to detain protesters and confine them in detention centers.

The police tactics for handling such mass incidents are now used in “Zero COVID” enforcement. Here are some examples.

On March 23, 2020, people tried to escape en masse from Hubei province, which was under lockdown. Police in Jiangxi province blocked traffic across a bridge between the two provinces, and beat and arrested many pedestrians who tried to cross the bridge on foot. This provoked a revolt involving more than ten thousand people.

On July 12, 2020, a conflict occurred between villagers and police in Village No. 1 of Daxing District, Beijing. The village had been locked down previously and had just been reopened. The police asked the villagers to buy a new pass card for 30 yuan. The villagers considered it another way for the police to exploit money and impose stricter control. So some villagers refused to buy the card, and then the police beat and detained them.

Another large city, Xi’an, in Shaanxi province, was locked down on December 23, 2021, with 13 million people locked in without prior notice. Because the government announced the lockdown suddenly, people had no time to stock up on food. A video appeared on the Internet showing a police officer placing a seal on a family’s door while the couple inside repeatedly asked him for help. The couple said they had called several stores and the community office several times asking for food, but no one answered their calls. They begged the police officer to contact the authorities to get food before sealing the door, saying that otherwise they would not be able to survive. The police officer rejected their pleas for help, saying he had only been ordered to seal the door and that it was not his responsibility to help them.

C. China’s Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau (UALEB)

In addition to the police, every city in China has a UALEB (城管) that acts as a sub-police. In 2013, the staff and volunteers employed in UALEBs across China exceeded one million people. The functions of these urban administrators consist mainly of managing temporary, urgent, difficult and thorny tasks in the city. They are often accused of beating vegetable vendors on the streets, forcibly demolishing residents’ homes and other similar acts.

One example of a task assigned to the UALEB is the forced demolition of residential buildings. Chinese cities undertake large real estate development efforts every year to generate GDP. Municipal authorities not only build on vacant lots, but also choose some old residential regions to rebuild. The UALEB, sometimes backed by the police, is in charge of demolishing the old houses, despite the residents’ objections. They harass or beat residents to force them to move. They even bring bulldozers to tear down old houses if residents continue to refuse to cooperate, sometimes even burying residents in the rubble. If protests occur in reaction to forced demolition, higher authorities may even blame the UALEB, firing some urban administrators to appease people’s anger.

During the Wuhan lockdown, residents had to order food and vegetables online from supermarkets. To help residents pick up their orders, some supermarkets placed customers’ packages on the street. On March 4, 2020, a group of armed urban administrators arrived at one of these supermarkets, saying that selling food on the street is illegal. The UALEB administrators proceeded to beat the supermarket workers present on the street, a treatment typically given to street vendors.

On December 12, 2021, while the city of Guangzhou, in Guangdong province, was under partial lockdown due to COVID, a video circulated on Chinese social media showing a middle-aged UALEB member brutally beating a young man. The young man, a volunteer journalist, was slapped, punched, kicked and hit on the head with a metal kettle, all for more than 6 minutes. Although several bystanders begged the attacker to stop, no one intervened, as the man wore a red armband that said “urban administrator.” This video garnered millions of views on the Internet before the CCP’s cyber police removed it from the web. In the end, there was no result other than angry comments online, as the Chinese people are used to being “handled” by urban administrators.

When a city is locked down, urban administrators close all hotels, restaurants and public facilities. Visitors who are in the city are also subject to quarantine, being forced to pay for an extended hotel stay for the duration of the lockdown.

D. China’s Unique Community Management Agents: Militia and Grid Managers

The new urban development of Chinese cities follows the “walled community” model: All communities, including government buildings, hospitals, schools, residential complexes, etc., are surrounded by walls and monitored with numerous cameras. These communities usually have one or several gates and are protected by security guards.

Each “community” has a control office that monitors the video feeds from the surveillance cameras installed at the gates, walls and light poles. The monitoring and recording of community residents involves the use of advanced technology, such as facial recognition systems.

The use of this high-tech surveillance in combination with the walled residential community model makes it possible for the CCP to impose strict lockdowns. By closing the community gates and sealing each resident’s home, the community can easily become a prison-like camp.

In China, each community has a “community committee.” These committees can be compared roughly to “homeowners’ associations” in the United States, with the difference that community committees in China answer to local CCP offices. The committee of a given community usually hires a security team with the homeowners’ money to watch the gates and patrol the community. The community committee and the security team form a single group to ensure that no resident escapes from their homes during quarantine.

The CCP also mobilizes the militia and community volunteers to assist in various “Zero COVID” activities.

China has 8 million militia members. Before the pandemic, the militias were not as active. Currently, the militias are active throughout China. As a sub-police force, these militias actively patrol communities and detain anyone who tries to escape from a locked-down community. Militia members may be equipped with a baton, a shield, a uniform and other devices.

Another CCP control mechanism is the Grid Managers (网格员).

Beginning in 2004, the CCP began creating the Grid Manager system with the goal of further extending its control at the neighborhood level. Each city divides its territory into several grids, each measuring approximately 100 by 100 meters (about 2.5 acres). A given residential community may be made up of multiple grids. One city grid may have as few as 15 or 20 families. The CCP also implements grid control in certain parts of the countryside, where each grid may contain about 40 people.

Local CCP branches recruit and pay grid managers, assigning one or more of them to each grid. Grid managers monitor and report on the daily life of each resident within the assigned grid, following the CCP’s official manual for grid administration. Grid managers pay special attention to religious believers and political dissidents, such as Falun Gong practitioners, members of Christian churches and Uyghurs.

The manager of a given grid can visit any family within their grid at any time. The manager can take photos of residents or require them to sign forms. Managers also monitor residents’ online activity. They can even call residents: “Hello, I am your grid manager, your wall-breaker. Have you gotten the COVID vaccine?”

Grid managers check and record all the facilities in their square, such as road lights, drainage manhole covers and other relevant facilities, making sure no corner of their square is neglected. At first glance, it may seem that careful accounting of physical resources could benefit local residents. In reality, this accounting serves to support the CCP’s control and surveillance program. For example, ensuring that public lighting is in good working order allows the CCP’s camera surveillance system to work optimally on that stretch of road.

In addition to aiding surveillance, the CCP uses this grid-level accounting of resources to get ahead of those who might resist or fight the regime. This concern took shape during the era of Jiang Zemin as head of the CCP. For example, when Jiang visited Germany in April 2002, he asked the German government to seal all manhole covers along the route his tour would follow. This was to prevent any attack on Jiang’s motorcade from below.

Grid managers played an important role in implementing the “Zero COVID” policy. On March 10, 2020, a CCP newspaper, Legal Daily, reported that around 4.5 million grid managers in China helped in the containment of COVID-19; the CCP praised their contributions in mobilizing volunteers. They motivated residents to cooperate with containment activities, and even advocated for residents to sacrifice themselves.

Ruili, a city located on the border between China and Myanmar (Burma) in China’s Yunnan province, used to be a hub of cross-border trade. Before the pandemic, the city had a floating population of nearly half a million, but that number declined considerably since COVID occurred. The authorities imposed lockdowns five times, suppressing the city’s role in trade with Myanmar and causing many people to leave. As a result, the city’s population dropped to about 100,000 people. Ruili’s former deputy mayor, Dai Rongli, even wrote a public letter on October 28, 2021, asking the government to adjust its COVID strategy to save the city.

However, not all of Ruili’s grid managers share the view that the city’s population decline should be stopped. As one grid manager said in August 2021, “it is worth it even if all the people of Ruili die. At least we have protected the country.”

Many online commenters considered this grid manager’s mindset to reflect the cruel attitude of the CCP, and some netizens compared the CCP’s grid managers with the leaders of local branches of the Nazi Party. During the heyday of the Nazi Party’s power, Nazi Party branch leaders were responsible for watching those living in their area, and one branch leader was responsible for monitoring about 50 German families.

By the numbers, the CCP far exceeded the Nazi Party: the CCP has 4.86 million local branches and more than 92 million members. If we add the additional 4.5 million grid managers, the regime achieved greater control over the Chinese people.

By governing China with “guns” and “knives” [the army and the police], the CCP sowed fear in the minds of many Chinese. This led the Chinese people to be quite obedient under the CCP’s “Zero COVID” policy. Lockdown conditions were harsh, and many expressed their criticism online, but organized protests in the streets are almost unheard of.

However, complaints on the Internet do not scare the CCP; it can quickly wipe “unharmonized” voices from the web, as we will discuss in Part II of this series, on the CCP’s “soft weapons.” In this way, China remains quietly under control, and the CCP continues its practice of “maintaining stability” at the expense of human rights.

This article was originally published in China Scope on March 31, 2022.

Author: Huai Ning

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