Part 3: The Implementation of the Communist Framework Through Force and Coercion<\/a><\/p>\nPart 4: Post-Stalin Evolution and the Collapse of the USSR<\/p>\n
Part 5: The CCP 1989\u20131992: Ideological Hybridization and Strategy of Attack<\/p>\n
Part 6: The CCP 1993\u20132021: Evolution and Current Situation<\/p>\n
The term of Jiang Zemin (1993\u20132003) was characterized by two fundamental aspects. The first is the continuation of economic opening and reforms, culminating in China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The theory of the “triple representativeness,” which justifies the inclusion of executives and businesspeople in the party, proved controversial among more conservative sectors and did not achieve the status of a “theory” like those of Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and later Xi Jinping. The second aspect is the particularly harsh application of Sun Tzu’s maxim, “To govern many as if they were few is simply a matter of dividing them into groups.” Population control relies in part on social divisions: Party members, ordinary citizens, and ethnic and religious minorities. While accelerating economic reforms, the CCP has brutally increased pressure on minorities, both in Tibet and among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, and, since 1999, on practitioners of the Falun Gong cultivation method. Falun Gong (also called Falun Dafa) is an ancient qigong discipline that combines slow, deliberate movements and meditation with a moral philosophy centered on the principles of Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance. Falun Gong gained popularity in the early 1990s, reaching approximately 100 million practitioners in China in less than a decade\u2014more than the number of members of the CCP. This alarmed Jiang Zemin, who created the 610 Office with the goal of \u201ceradicating\u201d the practice. To this end, a multifaceted propaganda campaign was launched, along with a program of ideological conversion and re-education in labor camps, and a variety of coercive measures, including physical torture and the forced organ harvesting from living practitioners for sale in state-run hospitals with the approval of Chinese health authorities.<\/p>\n
Hu Jingtao (2003\u20132013) succeeded Jiang Zemin in a complex but peaceful transition. Hu partially rebalances the internal pressure on the local population with the concept of a \u201charmonious society\u201d while abroad he continues the strategy of deceiving the West by proposing the narrative of \u201cpeaceful rise.\u201d The lie of \u201cpeaceful rise\u201d was explained in terms such as the following: \u201c\u2026we not only open our domestic market, but we also take advantage of the world market as a way of ensuring peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world. We seek a situation that is mutually beneficial for all, in which there are no losers, only winners, competing on a level playing field for all countries equally, with the same rules and under the principle of being able to obtain the greatest advantages while avoiding negative factors\u201d [2]. What is truly curious is that, thanks to the coordinated efforts of diplomacy, media control, and the actions of the United Front Work Department, very few people and institutions at that time seemed surprised or protested, despite the fact that the systematic activities of theft and espionage, along with the slow pace of truly opening its domestic market, were common knowledge.<\/p>\n
\u201cTherefore, a wise general strives to deprive the enemy of food. Every kilogram of food taken from the enemy is equivalent to twenty kilograms supplied to oneself\u201d (Sun Tzu). During Hu’s presidency, the country, which had been growing at an annual rate of 10.5% from 2001 to 2010, became the world’s second-largest economy. Also, within this context and capitalizing on macroeconomic success, a new identity-based nationalism was promoted, constructing a narrative\u2014a new hybrid of Party values \u200b\u200band ancient traditional culture\u2014capable of replacing Western modernity, whose success was seen as impoverishing China. The apparent success of the Chinese model enhances the value of the CCP and justifies it to its population as a new dynasty that will restore China’s historical leadership in the world after the imperial dynasties of the past.<\/p>\n
The arrival of Xi Jinping [2] to power in 2013 provided an additional impetus to expansionist plans and strengthened his leadership within the Party and, consequently, in the country. We highlight three lines of action. First, immediately upon taking office, Xi launched a massive anti-corruption campaign, the most extreme since Mao, with hundreds of thousands of arrests at all levels (\u201ctigers and flies\u201d) of the Party, the secret service, and the military, and half a million officials sanctioned. Particular severity was shown toward Jiang Zemin\u2019s so-called \u201cShanghai Clan.\u201d Second, the constitution was amended to eliminate the two-term limit and incorporate \u201cXi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.\u201d Third, two ambitious expansionist plans were launched: the Belt and Road Initiative and \u201cMade in China 2025.\u201d The first, drawing on the ancient Silk Road, is based on the creation of six economic and maritime corridors to promote international trade and, in reality, increase the regime’s influence in the countries (usually developing ones) where the necessary infrastructure is being built. The second involves promoting local manufacturing to achieve “global technological leadership” by 2049 (the centenary of the CCP’s rise to power). If we add to this a more belligerent diplomatic stance in recent years (Wolf Warrior’s diplomacy), it gives the impression that the Party, feeling strong, has clearly gone on the offensive on the main fronts.<\/p>\n
The world’s second-largest economy, relatively unaffected by the 2008-2011 financial crisis, leading in technologies such as 5G, possessing the world’s largest manufacturing capacity, the largest naval fleet, the world’s second-largest military, and with very ambitious expansion plans. Multiple Western media outlets and analysts have been highlighting these figures for several years, portraying China as the future leading power in the new world order. Recently, as we reported on this website, former Spanish President Jos\u00e9 Luis Rodr\u00edguez Zapatero wrote an article for the China Daily about the world’s need to accept and adapt to China’s increasingly decisive role on the global geopolitical stage. While it is true that many of these Western voices are influenced, more or less directly, by the CCP to fulfill its mission of foreign propaganda, it is also true that some are falling into the trap of accepting the official data of the Chinese autocratic regime as fact. Let us remember once again that “every military operation involves deception” (Sun Tzu) and that the secrecy surrounding information is extreme.<\/p>\n
Michael Beckley [5], a professor at Tufts University in the US, published a book in 2018 that analyzed in detail inconsistencies in the official data of the Chinese regime and misunderstandings about its implications. For example, it is a fact that China was the world’s largest economy in terms of GDP in the 1830s, but this did not prevent it from losing the Opium Wars to Great Britain, despite far surpassing it in troop numbers and economic size. One of the conclusions is that “mass\/size” (GDP, for example) is not the same as “power\/strength.” For GDP, which is a calculated rather than measured figure and therefore subject to manipulation, to be representative of a nation’s power, the allocation of resources must be appropriate, and if there is one thing that characterizes autocratic systems like that of the Chinese Communist Party, it is precisely the opposite. Within the ongoing information \u201cdeception,\u201d it is known that more than a fifth of homes in China are vacant, that domestic debt is staggering (at least three times the GDP), that the progressive aging of the population will severely impact the economy in the coming years, and that due to the regime’s sustained repression of the population, its popularity is declining, as the Hong Kong protests (pre-COVID) demonstrated to the world. Furthermore, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption purge immediately upon assuming power reinforces the idea of \u200b\u200bmajor flaws in the process of optimally allocating economic and human resources. Just as the Chernobyl incident revealed the defects of the nuclear program to the world and, indirectly, served as an early indicator of the Soviet system’s decline, is the COVID-19 pandemic the CCP’s Chernobyl?<\/p>\n
Referencias:<\/strong>
\n[1] http:\/\/english.people.com.cn\/data\/people\/jiangzemin.shtml; https:\/\/www.abc.es\/espana\/20140210\/abci-audiencia-nacional-tibet-201402101419.html: Cook, Sarah; Lemish, Leeshai (Noviembre de 2011).\u00a0\u00abThe 610 Office:Policing the Chinese Spirit\u00bb.\u00a0China Brief\u00a011\u00a0(17).\u00a0https:\/\/jamestown.org\/program\/the-610-office-policing-the-chinese-spirit\/Ong, Larry (8 de julio de 2016).\u00a0\u00abInspection of \u2018Chinese Gestapo\u2019 Begins With Unusual Announcement\u00bb.\u00a0La Gran Epoca.\u00a0https:\/\/www.theepochtimes.com\/inspection-of-chinese-gestapo-begins-with-unusual-announcement_2110591.html Spiegel, Mickey (2002).\u00a0Dangerous Meditation: China’s Campaign Against Falungong. New York: Human Rights Watch.\u00a0ISBN\u00a01-56432-270-X.https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/reports\/2002\/china\/China0102-02.htm#P331_49488 “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary”-\u00a0Published by Cambridge University Press:\u00a0\u00a020 March 2003 https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20101011130705\/http:\/\/www.spanish.xinhuanet.com\/spanish\/2008-03\/16\/content_597295.htm; https:\/\/www.eastasiaforum.org\/2011\/07\/10\/chinese-leadership-the-challenge-in-2012\/
\n[2] CWI-Agust\u00edn Puzo, 2020- \u201cChina, 70 a\u00f1os de guerra encubierta\u201d
\n[3] Sun Tzu- \u201cEl Arte de la Guerra\u201d
\n[4] http:\/\/epaper.chinadaily.com.cn\/a\/202103\/29\/WS60610540a31099a234354f9b.html
\n[5] https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2021\/05\/china-paper-dragon\/618778\/<\/p>\nParte 7: Conclusiones: \u00bfEst\u00e1 el colapso del PCCh cerca?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The Fall of Communism in China: Lessons from the Collapse of the USSR Part 1: Introduction Part 2: The Communist Framework Part 3: The Implementation of the Communist Framework Through Force and Coercion Part 4: Post-Stalin Evolution and the Collapse of the USSR Part 5: The CCP 1989\u20131992: Ideological Hybridization and Strategy of Attack Part…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":16761,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[767],"tags":[1098,1100],"class_list":["post-18154","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-ccp","tag-100-years-of-communism","tag-ccp"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18154","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=18154"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18154\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":18155,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18154\/revisions\/18155"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/16761"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=18154"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=18154"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.chinawatchinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=18154"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}